of the Same: Revival of Military Courts
A view of the Parliamentary Leaders addressing a Press Conference
after a meeting in the Speaker of National Assembly’s Chamber on February
28, 2017 to forge consensus on revival of Military Courts
What had been dreaded has transpired; the elected
Government, with the expiry of the sunset clause of the 21st Constitutional
Amendment on January 07, 2017, has sought an extension in the term of the Military
Courts for another two years. Major political parties have thrown their weight
behind the proposal as well, including the JUI-F and the JI with the Pakistan
Peoples Party, however, still hesitant on the matter.
The formation of the Military Courts came about
as an ‘extraordinary measure’ in the aftermath of the APS tragedy
of December 16, 2014; packaged by Government as a somewhat bitter pill that
had to be swallowed for a short while not only as a way to eradicate terrorism
but as a stop-gap arrangement due to inefficiencies of the legal system, hence
the two-year sunset clause allowing the Government and Parliament to bring in
necessary reforms to strengthen the legal system to adequately and effectively
manage challenges of terrorism. Reforms in the criminal justice system within
two years were also a central tenet of the National Action Plan (NAP). However,
without any progress on reforming the judicial system, the proposal to re-establish
military courts is tantamount to Government failure.
This highly contentious creation of a parallel
system of justice was passed in the shape of 21st Constitutional Amendment by
the current Parliament in January 2015. However, the Parliament, for its part,
has also done precious little in the past two years on reviewing the performance
of the Government on reforms in Pakistan’s criminal justice system. Although
the Senate did a commendable job to produce a detailed report on the Provision
of Inexpensive and Speedy Justice in the Country after detailed deliberations
in its Committee of the Whole in December 2015, the Parliament on the whole
did not exercise its oversight role in a befitting manner. Its Committees should
have sought monthly reports from the Government on the steps taken to reform
the justice system. Had the Parliament done its duty at that time, it would
not be discussing again today whether or not to give two more years to the Government
for the same purpose.
Due to the failure of both the Government and
the Parliament, it is indeed disappointing that we find ourselves at the same
cross roads again, with the same arguments being floated.
To add to the frustration, there are no real
statistics or communication by the Government on the utility that Military Courts
have extended in the fight against terrorism. This much is known that during
their tenure, military courts tried 274 cases of terrorism and sentenced 161
terrorists to death, whereas another 116 were given varying jail terms, mostly
life sentences. Out of the 161 sentenced to death, 12 have been executed till
now.
According to the numbers calculated by PILDAT
based on media reports which may or may not be completely accurate, convictions
of around 35 militants are pending before the Peshawar High Court.1 In addition, review petitions of at least 11 of the convicts of military
courts against dismissal of their earlier appeals are also pending before the
Supreme Court. Given that the Supreme Court and High Courts have carried out
in-camera proceedings in this regard, it is difficult to verify the ground for
the appeals.
PILDAT reiterates that the following points
must be taken into consideration before making any hasty decision on the matter:
- The matter must be strictly resolved within the Parliament
and through its Committees, through detailed briefings by the Prime Minister
Office, Ministry of Defence and Interior, and senior Military Officials,
and not as has been done till now through Multi Party Conferences, or hasty
meetings of Parliamentary leaders within the Speakers’ Chambers.
- Given that terrorism still haunts Pakistan, even after
the two-year expiry of the Military Courts, reasons may be made clear why
the extraordinary measure achieved only partial success.
- Given its inability in instituting reforms in the criminal
justice system in the past two years, the Government may outline any proposals
it has in this regard with concrete timeline, along with also stating why
it was unable to bring these reforms in the first place during the past
two years.
- Unlike in the past, the Parliament must also redeem itself
and carry out an effective and regular oversight in this regard. Monitoring
progress on criminal justice reforms should be the responsibility of the
Parliamentary Committees on Law and Justice, and monitoring implementation
of the National Action Plan should be that of the Parliamentary Committees
on Interior. The most effective way to do so may be to combine the mental
and financial resources through combining the Standing Committees of the
Senate and the National Assembly for this purpose.
Radd-ul-Fassad
The launch of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad
on February 22, 2017 comes at the heels of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched during
the tenure of former COAS, Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif on June 15, 2014, which
had the main aim of neutralizing the former militant stronghold of North Waziristan.
Although the launching of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad
might have been in the offing for some time, its apparent catalyst was a series
of terrorist attacks that rocked all four provinces of Pakistan during the first
two weeks of February 2017, culminating in the attack on the popular shrine
of Shahbaz Qalandar at Sehwan on February 16, 2017.
Essentially, the objectives of the Operation
can be delineated as:2
- Eliminating any remaining and latent threats of terrorism
- Consolidating gains of previous operations
- Countrywide de-weaponization and explosive control
- Conduct of ‘Broad Spectrum Security’ by the
Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) in the province
- Greater border security management
Unlike Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which
was only restricted to North Waziristan, the theater of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad
will be the whole country.
Importantly, Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) have
also been deployed for the Operation in the province, although a decision had
already been taken in this regard in a meeting of the Apex Committee of the
Punjab on February 19, 20173. The suicide attack on Lahore’s Charing Cross on February 13, 2017
forms a crucial link to the deployment of Rangers in the province. Rangers have
been given policing powers under the Anti Terrorism Act of 1997, which was announced
in a notification issued by the Federal Ministry of Interior the same day Operation
Radd-ul-Fassad was announced.4
It is important to note that the deployment
of Rangers in a province had been construed to be an irritant for civil-military
relations in Pakistan by various observers. Regardless of whether there was
any truth to this or not, opposition parties such as the PPP and PTI on numerous
occasions have publically demanded deployment of Rangers in the province.
PILDAT believes that the following points need
to considered in this regard:
- Many procedural and constitutional precursors to the launch
of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad remain opaque. For instance, the ISPR
press release, which announced the launch of the Operation, does not make
it clear at what forum the decision to launch the Operation was made. The
Federal Cabinet’s last meeting was held on February 07, 2017, and
launching an operation across the country certainly did not figure on its
33-point agenda.5 Neither was a meeting of the National Security Committee, the country’s
‘principal decision-making body on matters of national security’
convened. Maybe the decision was taken at one of the security huddles convened
at the Prime Minister Office, which see inclusion of select members of the
Cabinet and military leadership with the notable but ironic exclusion of
the Federal Minister of Defence,.
- Notably, the announcement of the Operation came from the
ISPR, which usually assumes responsibility for issuing press releases on
security related measures, including launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb,
formation of Military Courts, formation of Provincial Apex Committees, etc.
In addition, it was only when Pakistani media persons accompanying the Premier
asked questions about the operation during his visit to Turkey that he clarified
that the decision to launch the operation had been taken at a meeting held
at Prime Minister House some days earlier. This creates the impression of
a dearth of ownership on part of the civilian elected Government for such
security related measures.
- This lack of ownership is also reflected on the part of
the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures in their responsibilities to
ask the right questions on targets and timelines of the operation as well
as carrying out their due oversight role. For example, the Parliamentary
Committees on Defence and Interior have hardly made any systematic effort
with regards to developing oversight on progress of implementation of National
Action Plan since it was formed.
- Lastly, questions also remain with regards to successful
implementation of the National Action Plan, and how shared responsibility
of the civil-military in relation to it will contribute to the success of
the Operation. Currently, as per PILDAT’s research, oversight on implementation
of NAP within the Government is being carried out by the Implementation
and Review Committee under the leadership of the National Security Advisor,
while data in relation to it is still being collated by NACTA. Resultantly,
an impression is perpetuated that implementation and oversight of NAP is
currently being done through ad-hoc measures, with no clear institutionalized
mechanism in place.
- Although de-weaponization, explosive control, better border
security management, counter-terrorism operations by Rangers in Punjab,
are mentioned as some of the key features of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad,
the eventual aims remain unclear. Without this clarity, Pakistan may seem
destined to lurch from one military operation to the other without measuring
the success of any of these.
(Retd.) Raheel Sharif to lead Saudi-led Military Alliance?
After his retirement, Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif,
former COAS, is in the news again amid rumours that he has accepted the proposition
to lead the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT).6
Although rumours were doing rounds in this regard
since December 2016, the Federal Minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Muhammad Asif,
MNA provided credence to these. While appearing on a talk show of Geo Television
called Naya Pakistan on January 06, 2017, he claimed that ‘the
agreement in this regard had been finalized a few days ago’. He went
on to claim that ‘as you are aware that this thing was in the pipeline
for quite some time and the Prime Minister was also part of the deliberations
… definitely our Government’s consent must have been part of this’.7
Pakistan had initially found itself in the crosshairs
of Middle Eastern politics as Saudi Arabia named it as part of its newly formed
military alliance of Muslim countries meant to combat terrorism, apparently
without first getting Pakistan’s consent. However, after initial ambiguity,
the Government had confirmed its participation in the alliance, but had said
that the scope of its participation would be defined after the Kingdom shared
the details of the coalition it was assembling.
As media commentaries gained speed, criticizing
the former COAS for becoming a part of an Alliance that may not have unanimous
support of all the Muslim countries, especially Iran, and the precarious position
this would place Pakistan in, the elected Government seemed to retract the publically
stated position. For example, only two days later on January 08, 2017, the Prime
Minister’s spokesperson, Mr. Mussadiq Malik, stated that no official proposal
had been shared with the elected Government in this regard.
In addition, in what can only be termed a complete
volte-face, while appearing before the Pakistan Senate on January 10, 2017,
the Federal Minister for Defence stated that the Federal Government was as of
yet unaware of any development regarding Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif’s appointment
as head of the coalition. He also said it was mandatory for him, as is for every
other retired army officer, to seek an NOC from the Defence Ministry before
embarking on any new assignment abroad, but a No Objection Certificate had not
been sought in this regard.8
Given that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made
no official communication in this regard, PILDAT regrets the casual and allusive
attitude of the Defence Minister during his talk show appearance on January
06, 2017. Given that he holds such an important portfolio, he not only should
have been better informed about the development, but may have also