Monitor on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan | January and February 2017

More

of the Same: Revival of Military Courts

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A view of the Parliamentary Leaders addressing a Press Conference

after a meeting in the Speaker of National Assembly’s Chamber on February

28, 2017 to forge consensus on revival of Military Courts

What had been dreaded has transpired; the elected

Government, with the expiry of the sunset clause of the 21st Constitutional

Amendment on January 07, 2017, has sought an extension in the term of the Military

Courts for another two years. Major political parties have thrown their weight

behind the proposal as well, including the JUI-F and the JI with the Pakistan

Peoples Party, however, still hesitant on the matter.

The formation of the Military Courts came about

as an ‘extraordinary measure’ in the aftermath of the APS tragedy

of December 16, 2014; packaged by Government as a somewhat bitter pill that

had to be swallowed for a short while not only as a way to eradicate terrorism

but as a stop-gap arrangement due to inefficiencies of the legal system, hence

the two-year sunset clause allowing the Government and Parliament to bring in

necessary reforms to strengthen the legal system to adequately and effectively

manage challenges of terrorism. Reforms in the criminal justice system within

two years were also a central tenet of the National Action Plan (NAP). However,

without any progress on reforming the judicial system, the proposal to re-establish

military courts is tantamount to Government failure.

This highly contentious creation of a parallel

system of justice was passed in the shape of 21st Constitutional Amendment by

the current Parliament in January 2015. However, the Parliament, for its part,

has also done precious little in the past two years on reviewing the performance

of the Government on reforms in Pakistan’s criminal justice system. Although

the Senate did a commendable job to produce a detailed report on the Provision

of Inexpensive and Speedy Justice in the Country after detailed deliberations

in its Committee of the Whole in December 2015, the Parliament on the whole

did not exercise its oversight role in a befitting manner. Its Committees should

have sought monthly reports from the Government on the steps taken to reform

the justice system. Had the Parliament done its duty at that time, it would

not be discussing again today whether or not to give two more years to the Government

for the same purpose.

Due to the failure of both the Government and

the Parliament, it is indeed disappointing that we find ourselves at the same

cross roads again, with the same arguments being floated.

To add to the frustration, there are no real

statistics or communication by the Government on the utility that Military Courts

have extended in the fight against terrorism. This much is known that during

their tenure, military courts tried 274 cases of terrorism and sentenced 161

terrorists to death, whereas another 116 were given varying jail terms, mostly

life sentences. Out of the 161 sentenced to death, 12 have been executed till

now.

According to the numbers calculated by PILDAT

based on media reports which may or may not be completely accurate, convictions

of around 35 militants are pending before the Peshawar High Court.1 In addition, review petitions of at least 11 of the convicts of military

courts against dismissal of their earlier appeals are also pending before the

Supreme Court. Given that the Supreme Court and High Courts have carried out

in-camera proceedings in this regard, it is difficult to verify the ground for

the appeals.

PILDAT reiterates that the following points

must be taken into consideration before making any hasty decision on the matter:

  1. The matter must be strictly resolved within the Parliament

    and through its Committees, through detailed briefings by the Prime Minister

    Office, Ministry of Defence and Interior, and senior Military Officials,

    and not as has been done till now through Multi Party Conferences, or hasty

    meetings of Parliamentary leaders within the Speakers’ Chambers.

  2. Given that terrorism still haunts Pakistan, even after

    the two-year expiry of the Military Courts, reasons may be made clear why

    the extraordinary measure achieved only partial success.

  3. Given its inability in instituting reforms in the criminal

    justice system in the past two years, the Government may outline any proposals

    it has in this regard with concrete timeline, along with also stating why

    it was unable to bring these reforms in the first place during the past

    two years.

  4. Unlike in the past, the Parliament must also redeem itself

    and carry out an effective and regular oversight in this regard. Monitoring

    progress on criminal justice reforms should be the responsibility of the

    Parliamentary Committees on Law and Justice, and monitoring implementation

    of the National Action Plan should be that of the Parliamentary Committees

    on Interior. The most effective way to do so may be to combine the mental

    and financial resources through combining the Standing Committees of the

    Senate and the National Assembly for this purpose.

Operation

Radd-ul-Fassad

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The launch of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad

on February 22, 2017 comes at the heels of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched during

the tenure of former COAS, Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif on June 15, 2014, which

had the main aim of neutralizing the former militant stronghold of North Waziristan.

Although the launching of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad

might have been in the offing for some time, its apparent catalyst was a series

of terrorist attacks that rocked all four provinces of Pakistan during the first

two weeks of February 2017, culminating in the attack on the popular shrine

of Shahbaz Qalandar at Sehwan on February 16, 2017.

Essentially, the objectives of the Operation

can be delineated as:2

  1. Eliminating any remaining and latent threats of terrorism
  2. Consolidating gains of previous operations
  3. Countrywide de-weaponization and explosive control
  4. Conduct of ‘Broad Spectrum Security’ by the

    Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) in the province

  5. Greater border security management

Unlike Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which

was only restricted to North Waziristan, the theater of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad

will be the whole country.

Importantly, Pakistan Rangers (Punjab) have

also been deployed for the Operation in the province, although a decision had

already been taken in this regard in a meeting of the Apex Committee of the

Punjab on February 19, 20173. The suicide attack on Lahore’s Charing Cross on February 13, 2017

forms a crucial link to the deployment of Rangers in the province. Rangers have

been given policing powers under the Anti Terrorism Act of 1997, which was announced

in a notification issued by the Federal Ministry of Interior the same day Operation

Radd-ul-Fassad was announced.4

It is important to note that the deployment

of Rangers in a province had been construed to be an irritant for civil-military

relations in Pakistan by various observers. Regardless of whether there was

any truth to this or not, opposition parties such as the PPP and PTI on numerous

occasions have publically demanded deployment of Rangers in the province.

PILDAT believes that the following points need

to considered in this regard:

  1. Many procedural and constitutional precursors to the launch

    of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad remain opaque. For instance, the ISPR

    press release, which announced the launch of the Operation, does not make

    it clear at what forum the decision to launch the Operation was made. The

    Federal Cabinet’s last meeting was held on February 07, 2017, and

    launching an operation across the country certainly did not figure on its

    33-point agenda.5 Neither was a meeting of the National Security Committee, the country’s

    principal decision-making body on matters of national security

    convened. Maybe the decision was taken at one of the security huddles convened

    at the Prime Minister Office, which see inclusion of select members of the

    Cabinet and military leadership with the notable but ironic exclusion of

    the Federal Minister of Defence,.

  2. Notably, the announcement of the Operation came from the

    ISPR, which usually assumes responsibility for issuing press releases on

    security related measures, including launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb,

    formation of Military Courts, formation of Provincial Apex Committees, etc.

    In addition, it was only when Pakistani media persons accompanying the Premier

    asked questions about the operation during his visit to Turkey that he clarified

    that the decision to launch the operation had been taken at a meeting held

    at Prime Minister House some days earlier. This creates the impression of

    a dearth of ownership on part of the civilian elected Government for such

    security related measures.

  3. This lack of ownership is also reflected on the part of

    the Parliament and Provincial Legislatures in their responsibilities to

    ask the right questions on targets and timelines of the operation as well

    as carrying out their due oversight role. For example, the Parliamentary

    Committees on Defence and Interior have hardly made any systematic effort

    with regards to developing oversight on progress of implementation of National

    Action Plan since it was formed.

  4. Lastly, questions also remain with regards to successful

    implementation of the National Action Plan, and how shared responsibility

    of the civil-military in relation to it will contribute to the success of

    the Operation. Currently, as per PILDAT’s research, oversight on implementation

    of NAP within the Government is being carried out by the Implementation

    and Review Committee under the leadership of the National Security Advisor,

    while data in relation to it is still being collated by NACTA. Resultantly,

    an impression is perpetuated that implementation and oversight of NAP is

    currently being done through ad-hoc measures, with no clear institutionalized

    mechanism in place.

  5. Although de-weaponization, explosive control, better border

    security management, counter-terrorism operations by Rangers in Punjab,

    are mentioned as some of the key features of Operation Radd-ul-Fassad,

    the eventual aims remain unclear. Without this clarity, Pakistan may seem

    destined to lurch from one military operation to the other without measuring

    the success of any of these.

Gen.

(Retd.) Raheel Sharif to lead Saudi-led Military Alliance?

After his retirement, Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif,

former COAS, is in the news again amid rumours that he has accepted the proposition

to lead the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT).6 

Although rumours were doing rounds in this regard

since December 2016, the Federal Minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Muhammad Asif,

MNA provided credence to these. While appearing on a talk show of Geo Television

called Naya Pakistan on January 06, 2017, he claimed that ‘the

agreement in this regard had been finalized a few days ago’. He went

on to claim that ‘as you are aware that this thing was in the pipeline

for quite some time and the Prime Minister was also part of the deliberations

…  definitely our Government’s consent must have been part of this’.7

Pakistan had initially found itself in the crosshairs

of Middle Eastern politics as Saudi Arabia named it as part of its newly formed

military alliance of Muslim countries meant to combat terrorism, apparently

without first getting Pakistan’s consent. However, after initial ambiguity,

the Government had confirmed its participation in the alliance, but had said

that the scope of its participation would be defined after the Kingdom shared

the details of the coalition it was assembling.

As media commentaries gained speed, criticizing

the former COAS for becoming a part of an Alliance that may not have unanimous

support of all the Muslim countries, especially Iran, and the precarious position

this would place Pakistan in, the elected Government seemed to retract the publically

stated position. For example, only two days later on January 08, 2017, the Prime

Minister’s spokesperson, Mr. Mussadiq Malik, stated that no official proposal

had been shared with the elected Government in this regard.

In addition, in what can only be termed a complete

volte-face, while appearing before the Pakistan Senate on January 10, 2017,

the Federal Minister for Defence stated that the Federal Government was as of

yet unaware of any development regarding Gen. (Retd.) Raheel Sharif’s appointment

as head of the coalition. He also said it was mandatory for him, as is for every

other retired army officer, to seek an NOC from the Defence Ministry before

embarking on any new assignment abroad, but a No Objection Certificate had not

been sought in this regard.8

Given that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has made

no official communication in this regard, PILDAT regrets the casual and allusive

attitude of the Defence Minister during his talk show appearance on January

06, 2017. Given that he holds such an important portfolio, he not only should

have been better informed about the development, but may have also