Citizens, State and Society support efforts to Achieve and Maintain Law and Order in Karachi

Picture showing the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) during the raid on Nine-Zero on March 11, 2015¹

The Pakistan Rangers’ (Sindh) ‘siege and search operation‘ on Nine-Zero, the Muttahida Quami Movement’s (MQM) Headquarters in Karachi,² on March 11, 2015 signaled the civil-military leadership’s resolve to effectively tackle the persistence of criminal and terrorist violence pulverizing Karachi for at least the past two decades.³ Therefore, when the Prime Minister stated on March 25, 2015 that ‘Karachi would be made a crime-free city and the operation would continue to achieve the objective‘⁴ and the COAS on February 16, 2015 that ‘Peace in Kci [Karachi] means prosperity for Pak [Pakistan]’, it seems that the ‘meaningful effort‘⁵ the latter called for has finally arrived; and none too soon.

Karachi, apart from being the hub of Pakistan’s financial and economic activities, has experienced all forms of violence, including ethno-political, militant, sectarian and criminal. According to data released by the Sindh Police and the Rangers, 2013 was the bloodiest year for Karachi ‘with 2,700 people killed and crime soaring past 40,000 reported incidents.’⁶

Achieving and maintaining law and order across Pakistan, especially in Karachi is of crucial importance to Pakistan. That it is done in a decisive and comprehensive manner, with a swift and above-board approach is the need of the hour. Pakistan’s citizens, State and society stand firmly behind this effort and its successful conclusion. PILDAT recognizes and lauds the decision to finally tackle all ‘non-state actors’ under the National Action Plan, especially in context of Karachi’s law and order problems and hopes that the operation will be taken to its ‘logical conclusion‘.⁷

Karachi operation may be a good example of civil-military cooperation but such an extended role of the armed forces in the domestic law and order situation is counter-productive. Democratic Government should develop a system of governance, like the rest of the civilized world, in which civilian institutions should be able to govern equitably without any pressure, influence or manipulation. A police force free from any partisan political influence is the basic ingredient for such a system. Recruitment, postings, transfers, promotions should all be based on merit. Not only the maintenance of law and order but also the investigation of crimes and effective prosecution of the accused should improve within a specific deadline.

 
Anatomy of the Karachi Crackdown: Imbalance in Civil-Military Law Enforcement Agencies

While extending its full support to it, PILDAT believes that the anatomy of the Karachi Operation tells a telling tale about civil-military relations at play in the city; more specifically, about the prominence and primacy of the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), and the apparent inability of the Sindh Police to deal with the crisis on its own. This denotes a clear imbalance between the civil and military Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) operating in Karachi, sadly resulting from the passive approach that successive Provincial Governments have adopted in increasing the effectiveness of the Police force by making its operations independent of political considerations. PILDAT believes that this ostensible incompetence and the resultant reliance on Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) does not augur well for civilian capacity to maintain law and order, once achieved, and an undue burden on Military and paramilitary forces of Pakistan.

Although Article 7(b) of The Pakistan Rangers Ordinance, 1959 states that ‘the Force [i.e. the Pakistan Rangers] shall reinforce the Police for the maintenance of law and order whenever it is necessary‘,⁸ the paramilitary force (whose personnel are contributed by the Pakistan Army and was originally created for border security), since its deployment in Sindh during the late 1980s, has become the face of crackdown against violence in Karachi, with the Police Service of Sindh ironically acting as an auxiliary outfit.

It has been seen on numerous occasions that whenever a wave of violence hits the city, the successive Provincial Governments have made decisions to further empower the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), rather than affecting any systematic reform in the Police. Nothing could be more illustrative of this than the Operation Clean-up in 1992, Operation Blue Fox from 1994-1996, the spate of violence in July 2011, the operation launched by the PML-N Government in September 2013, etc., which saw Rangers spearheading the crackdown, with the Police assisting.⁹

Here, the Supreme Court’s judgment on the law and order situation in Karachi (Suo Moto case no. 16 of 2011) is a damning indictment on the state of the Police force. While referring to the statement recorded by the then IGP Sindh, the judgment¹⁰ notes that:

The IGP conceded that 30-40 percent of police force are non-cooperative either for the reasons that they have secured their appointments on political considerations or they have associated themselves with different groups including political parties, having vested interests in the affairs of Karachi, therefore, at times it becomes very difficult for him to effectively take action against the real culprits.

Experts believe that years of politically-motivated postings and transfers by the Provincial Government have decapitated the Police force. The result has been years of neglect of the law and order situation in Karachi, with the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) being called in to clean up the mess.

The Provincial Government of Sindh must immediately adopt the Police Order of 2002 to depoliticize the institution, ensure professional training of its members, and recruitment based on merit to make it competent enough to discharge its duties without requiring the assistance of the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh). PILDAT’s report titled Police, Politics and the People of Pakistan can also be consulted for more details on relevant reform proposals and the state of Pakistan’s Police service. ¹¹

PILDAT also notes that the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) will have to tread a fine line, especially while conducting operations against the militant wings of various political parties, during the operation. Mr. Altaf Hussain’s somewhat belligerent response to the Rangers’ raid on the MQM headquarters, which many perceived to be a threat to members of the force,¹² underscores the resistance that the security apparatus might face in the course of its actions. Maintaining an apolitical approach and targeting all non-state actors, across the board, in Karachi, and for that matter in the entire province and the country is of utmost necessity, and will add to the prestige and image of the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh). An FIR has been lodged against Mr. Altaf Hussain for his threatening remarks against the Pakistan Rangers (Sindh) on national television.¹³ Such past pronouncements by Mr. Hussain were generally ignored, consequently compromising the rule of law. PILDAT believes that the law should equally and effectively apply to everyone, no matter how powerful or politically influential that individual or group may be.

 
Mr. Saulat Mirza’s ‘Confession’: A Development Shrouded in Ambiguity

A screen grab from Mr. Saulat Mirza’s ‘Confession’ video that surfaced on March 18, 2015

Events unfolding in Karachi in the aftermath of the MQM headquarters raid took a new turn when a ‘confession’ video of Mr. Saulat Mirza emerged late on March 18, 2015, hours before his execution, in which he alleged involvement of senior MQM leaders including Mr. Altaf Hussain and Mr. Babar Ghauri in the murder of the former Managing Director of Karachi Electric Supply Company (KESC) – now renamed as Karachi Electric.¹⁴ As if the surfacing of the video was not befuddling by itself, the Federal Government asked the Sindh Government to form a committee to investigate Mr. Saulat Mirza’s allegations.¹⁵ However, the committee formed by the Home Minister for Balochistan, Mr. Sarfraz Bugti, MPA, to investigate how the video was recorded from the jail cell has been dissolved. ¹⁶

These developments further compound the ambiguity and suspicion surrounding the whole affair, leading to several questions and concerns:

1. How was the video possibly recorded even though the Pakistan Prisoners Code prescribes such strict guidelines for prisoners on death-row? PILDAT believes that the cancellation of the inquiry into this severely affects the rule of law, and sets a negative precedent.


2. By whom was the video recorded and circulated? Till the time any conclusive investigation points otherwise, the primary suspects will remain the intelligence agencies, whether the civilian or the military.


3. The Federal Government has directed the Sindh Government to investigate Mr. Saulat Mirza’s claim. In order to allow the investigation to reach a logical conclusion, the execution may be deferred if required. Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 states that ‘In such cases as the Court may consider appropriate, the Court may allow to be produced any evidence that may have become available because of modern devices or techniques‘.

 
DG Rangers’ and Corp V Commander’s Briefing to the Prime Minister: Chief Minister Sindh Conspicuous by his Absence

Picture shows the Prime Minister; Chief Minister of Sindh, Syed Qaim Ali Shah, MPA; Corp V Commander, Lt. Gen. Naveed Mukhtar; DG Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), Maj. Gen. Bilal Akbar during a meeting at Faisal Airbase, Karachi on March 25, 2015¹⁷

The Chief Minister of Sindh, Syed Qaim Ali Shah, MPA, was conspicuous by his absence at a briefing given by the Corp V Commander, Lt. Gen. Naveed Mukhtar and DG Pakistan Rangers (Sindh), Maj. Gen. Bilal Akbar to the Prime Minister ‘on the status of ongoing operation against terrorists and criminals’ at the Faisal Airbase, Karachi on March 25, 2015.¹⁸ The Press Release issued by the Prime Minister Office further stated that ‘after the briefing Chief Minister Sindh, Syed Qaim Ali Shah also joined [the meeting]’. ¹⁹

The Chief Minister has been present at all the meetings on the ongoing operation chaired by the Prime Minister in Karachi but he was either not invited or he decided not to attend this particular briefing. The development raises two questions of relevance:  

1. PILDAT believes that the Prime Minister should have been more sensitive to the Chief Minister’s exclusion as the Chief Minster is the chief executive of the province and his absence can raise questions about the effectiveness of his position and of the operation.
2. Regardless, does not the Chief Minister’s absence apparently imply that he is not trustworthy enough to be included in briefings about the security situation in the province? Is this not implicitly a national security hazard?

 
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the Tribal Areas: Is the Elected Government Missing in Action?

Prime Minister distributing ration to a person displaced due to operations in the